HOW DO WE ASSESS ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE?
Nisrina1, Nuraini2,
Riha Dedi Priantana3
Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
nisrina33@gmail.com1, nurainia@unsyiah.ac.id2, rihadedi@unsyiah.ac.id3
|
KEYWORDS |
ABSTRACT |
|
company
size, independent board of commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional
ownership, audit committee, risk management. |
This
study aims to empirically explore company size and corporate governance as
determinants of risk management disclosure by investigating the effect of a
combination of determinants on risk management disclosure practices in
manufacturing companies. This study used a random sampling method. The sample
for this research is 189 manufacturing companies (3 years of observation)
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2019-2021 period. The COSO
2017 spreadsheet was used to measure the level of risk management disclosure.
Panel data regression analysis using the Eviews program version 10 was used
to examine the effect of company size and corporate governance on risk
management disclosure. The results showed that company size, institutional ownership,
and audit committee had a positive effect. In contrast, the size of the board
of commissioners hurt risk management. The independent board of commissioners
with managerial ownership shows results that do not affect risk management in
manufacturing companies in Indonesia. |
|
DOI: 10.58860/ijsh.v2i8.88 |
|
Corresponding Author: Nisrina
Email: nisrina33@gmail.com
INTRODUCTION
Risk is an unexpected situation and can occur in every
activity carried out by a company. The collapse of the world's largest companies raises big
question marks for the implementation of risk management, from the failure of
Baring Bank in (1995), the failure of Enron in (2001), the failure of WorldCom
in (2002), and the Toshiba fraud case in (2015). Shows that there is a failure in
risk management (Yuniasih
et al., 2011). The
risk management process is essential for the company because, in addition to
maintaining the stability of the company in facing risk, it also increases
investors' trust (Rujiin & Sukirman,
2020).
Disclosure of risk management is essential for non-financial companies because
it can be helpful for supervisory bodies to develop more detailed guidelines on
risk management disclosures in non-financial companies Abdullah et al., (2017).
There are several
cases of company bankruptcy caused by the company's failure to manage risks, as
published by the Indonesia Risk Management Professional Association (IRMAPA); the case of PT Nyonya Meneer
was declared bankrupt by the Semarang District Court (PN). The heavy burden of
debt that is borne makes the company no longer healthy. In addition to debt
burdens, disputes over power struggles between families are said to have
triggered the bankruptcy of the company founded in 1919. In the case of the
debt, the company was declared bankrupt because it could not fulfill its debt
obligations of Rp. Two hundred fifty-two billion to 85 creditors. PT. Mrs.
Meneer has debts to several State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), such as the Pratama
Tax Office of IDR 36 billion, BPJS Kesehatan, IDR 1 billion, and BPJS
Employment, IDR 12 billion. Then debt to employees was also recorded at IDR 29
billion.
The following
case that resulted in the company going bankrupt due to failure to pay off its
obligations was a tea company, PT Sariwangi Agricultural Estate Agency.
According to the kompas.com article (2018), there were financial problems in
2015 at PT Sariwangi Agricultural Estate Agency with its affiliated company, PT
Indorub Sumber Wadung Plantation Airlines. The two companies are in debt of up
to 1.5 trillion to several creditors. The factor that causes unpaid loans is
that PT Sariwangi Agricultural Estate Agency has invested in 3 technologies in
terms of sprinkling water on tea plantations to increase the production of tea
produced on these plantations, which will automatically require high costs.
Unfortunately, the investment made by PT Sariwangi Agricultural Estate Agency
failed, causing the company to be unable to repay the debt borrowed from
creditors.
In addition, fraud cases have also occurred at PT. Kimia Farma (Devi et al., 2017) . This case began
when the company submitted audit results on December 31, 2001, which were
audited by Hans Tuanakotta and Mustofa (HTM). However, BUMN and Bapepam
considered that the financial statements contained engineering. After a
re-audit, on October 3, 2002, the company's financial statements were restated,
and it was found that the profit earned did not match what was reported. The failure
to manage risk that even involves companies that are hundreds of years old
shows the weakness of risk management disclosure, which should be able to help
control management activities to minimize the occurrence of fraud in both
developed and developing countries, including Indonesia.
The actor
that influences risk management disclosure is company size. Company size is the size of
the company's capital and human resources. Usually, large companies will
disclose more information than small companies. Also, the bigger the company,
the more stakeholders are involved
(Rudangga & Sudiarta, 2016). The results of previous
research on company size on risk management showed inconsistent results, which
concluded that company size had a positive effect on Adam et al. (2016), Pristianingrum et al. (2018), and Rujiin & Sukirman (2020). Meanwhile, other studies concluded
that the results did not affect Ramadhani
et al. ( 2015) and, Sanusi
et al. ( 2017), Falendro et al. (2018).
Meanwhile, other factors that influence risk management are corporate
governance proxied by the size of the board of commissioners, independent board
of commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and audit
committee. Rustam ( 2017) states that improving
corporate governance is one way that can be used to reduce company risk so that
information users can identify, measure, and manage the risks that arise from
all business activities, both credit risk, operational risk, or other risks, to
optimize company value.
Based on the background
description above, this study aims to empirically explore the company size and
corporate governance as determinants of risk management disclosure by
investigating the influence of the combination of determinants on risk
management disclosure practices in manufacturing companies..
METHODS
The data used is the data panel. Panel data
is a combination
of time
series and cross-section. Time series is data from one object with
several specific periods, while cross-section is data obtained from one or more
research objects in the same period. The data used in this study is secondary
data in the form of annual reports of manufacturing companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).
Table 1 . Sample Selection Process
|
Criteria |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
|
Manufacturing companies listed on the IDX for
the 2019-2021 period |
181 |
193 |
211 |
|
Manufacturing companies that do not
consistently issue financial reports in the 2019-2021 period |
(13) |
(25) |
(43) |
|
Total population |
168 |
168 |
168 |
|
Manufacturing companies that are the research
sample with the Slovin formula |
63 |
63 |
63 |
|
total sample |
189 |
||
The population in this study
are manufacturing sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in
2019-2021. The research sample consisted of 63
companies with 189 observations during the observation period. The sampling
technique in this study uses probability random sampling, where the population
is drawn using a number table or random numbers so that all population members
have the same opportunity to be sampled (Sugiyono, 2019).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on 63
companies with a total observation of 189 companies during the observation
period, the descriptive results of the variables studied can be seen in Table
2:
Table 2. Descriptive
Statistics (N=189)
|
Variable |
Minimum |
Maximum |
Means |
Standard Deviation |
|
Risk management |
0.400 |
0.950 |
0.71 |
0.113 |
|
Company Size |
11,874 |
16,738 |
14,42 |
0.909 |
|
Size of the Board of
Commissioners |
7 |
8 |
7,76 |
0.430 |
|
Independent Board of
Commissioners |
3 |
4 |
3.72 |
0.448 |
|
Managerial ownership |
0.010 |
0.306 |
0.08 |
0.076 |
|
Institutional Ownership |
7,047 |
22,317 |
12.93 |
4,465 |
|
Audit Committee |
3 |
4 |
3.66 |
0.474 |
Source: Processed Secondary
Data, 2022
Based on Table 4, it can be
seen the minimum, maximum, average, and standard deviation values of the
variables studied. The risk management implementation variable is calculated by
dividing the total implementation by the sum of all items implemented, with a
maximum value of 0.950, a minimum value of 0.400, and an average of 0.71. The
higher the value of risk management, the higher the company implements
corporate risk management. On the other hand, the smaller the value, the
smaller the company's risk management implementation. On average, 71% of
companies have implemented enterprise risk management with a standard deviation
of 0.113, indicating that the size of the risk management spread tends to be
homogeneous because the value is smaller than the average value.
The research
data is divided into three categories using the formula shown in Table 3. To
obtain a descriptive picture of ERM disclosure data by manufacturing companies
in annual reports during the study period. The results of classifying research
data using the data classification formula quoted from research by Riwidikdo
(2009) are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
The
average ERM disclosure calculated based on Table 4 is 71.49%, indicating that
overall manufacturing companies have a moderate level of ERM disclosure (based
on the range of scores in Table 4). ERM disclosure provisions regarding the
minimum requirements for items that non-financial companies must disclose cause
manufacturing companies to pay less attention to the completeness of ERM
disclosure instruments and tend to present general information.
Table 3. Formulas Data Categorization
|
Classification |
intervals |
|
Tall |
X > M +
1 SD |
|
Currently |
M 1 SD <
X < M + 1 SD |
|
Low |
X < M
1 SD |
|
Source: Riwidikdo (2009) |
|
Table 4. Results Categorization Data (Disclosure ERM)
|
Category |
Score |
Amount |
Percentage |
|
Tall |
> 82 |
30 |
15.87% |
|
Currently |
61 82 |
116 |
61.38% |
|
Low |
< 61 |
43 |
22.75% |
|
Total |
|
189 |
100% |
The average value of ERM
disclosure calculated based on Table 5 is 71.49%, indicating that, as a whole,
manufacturing companies have a moderate level of ERM disclosure (based on the
range of scores in Table 4). Based on the calculations in Table 5, the
dimensions of information, communication, and reports have the highest percentage
of 81.83%. In comparison, the dimensions of strategy and goal setting have the
lowest percentage of the total score of 69.05%. These results indicate that, in
general, manufacturing companies pay more attention to the process of
conveying information, communication, and reporting in the company. At the same
time, the dimensions of strategy and setting risk objectives are still less of
a concern for manufacturing companies.
Table 5. Results of the
Frequency of Disclosure of Each Item
ERM Disclosures on Each Dimension ERM Disclosures
|
The Five Dimensions of
ERM Disclosure |
The total score of all
items that should be disclosed, calculated from the total of all observations
(63 companies x 3 years = 189 observations) |
The total score of all
disclosed ERM disclosure items |
Percentage of the total
score of all disclosed ERM disclosure items |
|
Governance and Organizational Culture
(5 items) |
945 |
697 |
73.76% |
|
Strategy and Goal Setting (4 Principles) |
756 |
522 |
69.05% |
|
Performance (5 Principles) |
945 |
657 |
69.52% |
|
Review and Revision (3 principles |
567 |
359 |
63.31% |
|
Information, Communication, and Reports (3 items) |
567 |
464 |
81.83% |
Average ERM Disclosure = ( 73.76% + 69.05% +
69.52% + 63.31% + 81.83%)/5
= 71.49% (Including medium category)
Research
Hypothesis
Table 6. Hypothesis
Testing Results
|
Variables |
coefficient |
std.
Error |
t-Statistics |
Prob. |
|
C |
-0.097397 |
0.129973 |
-0.749366 |
0.4551 |
|
UP |
0.654864 |
0.059359 |
11.03231 |
0.0000 |
|
UDK |
-0.013818 |
0.005733 |
-2.410205 |
0.0175 |
|
DKI |
0.042215 |
0.022489 |
1.877140 |
0.0629 |
|
km |
0.049382 |
0.025014 |
1.974164 |
0.0507 |
|
KI |
0.008929 |
0.001088 |
8.209328 |
0.0000 |
|
ka |
0.079696 |
0.010427 |
7.643281 |
0.0000 |
|
Cross-section
fixed (dummy variables) |
||||
|
R-squared |
0.903650 |
Mean dependent var |
0.714021 |
|
|
Adjusted R-squared |
0.849051 |
SD dependent var |
0.110856 |
|
|
SE of regression |
0.043070 |
Akaike info criterion |
-3.176078 |
|
|
Sum squared residue |
0.222603 |
Schwarz criterion |
-1.992583 |
|
|
Likelihood logs |
369.1394 |
Hannan-Quinn criteria. |
-2.696616 |
|
|
F-statistics |
16.55079 |
Durbin-Watson stat |
2.116487 |
|
|
Prob(F-statistic) |
0.000000 |
|
|
|
Source: Secondary data processed, 2022
Simultaneous Test (Test F)
Based on the results of hypothesis testing, an F
value of 16,551 is obtained with a significance of 0,000. A significance value < 0.05 indicates that Company Size, Board of
Commissioners Size, Independent Board of Commissioners, Managerial Ownership,
Institutional Ownership, and Audit Committee affect Risk Management.
Determination
Coefficient Test ( R square )
The coefficient of determination test aims to determine the influence of
the independent variables on the dependent variable. Based
on the results of testing the hypothesis, the R squares
value is 0.9036 or 90.36%. This shows that the joint effect of company size, board of commissioners, independent
commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and audit
committee on risk management is 90.36%. At the same time, the remaining 9.64%
is influenced by other variables outside the study.
Partial
Test (t-test)
The t-statistical Test was carried out to measure how much influence an
independent variable has in explaining variations in the dependent variable.
There is a significant effect if the significance value is less than 0.05.
The Effect of Company Size on ERM
Disclosures
The test results show that there is a significant effect of company size
on risk management. This is
evidenced by a
significance of 0.000 (significance smaller than 0.05). So Company Size has a
significant effect on Risk Management. The coefficient value of Firm Size (X 1
) is b 1 = 0.654, so it can be said that there is a positive
influence, meaning that the larger the size of the company, the more detailed
information will be disclosed so that the quality of ERM disclosure will be
better.
Based on agency theory, large
companies have higher agency costs when compared to small companies (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). Previous research stated that the larger the size of the company, the number
of stakeholders in the company also increases, so more information must be
disclosed to meet stakeholders' needs (Amran & Devi (2008). In addition, large companies pay much
attention to the public; disclosing company information is part of the
company's efforts to realize public accountability to maintain the company's
reputation and good name. The larger the company, the higher the ERM disclosure
(Larasati,
2020). This research is in line with previous research, which found that company size positively affects risk
management (Adam
et al., 2016; Pristianingrum et al., 2018; Rujiin & Sukirman, 2020).
Effect of Board
of Commissioners' Size on ERM Disclosure
The test results show a significant effect of board
size on risk management. This is evidenced by a
significance of 0.017 (significance smaller than 0.05). So that the size of the
board of commissioners has a significant effect on risk management. The
coefficient value of the size of the board of Commissioners (X 2 )
is b 2 = -0.013, so it can be said that there is a negative
influence, meaning that every time there is an increase in the number of
commissioners, it reduces the level of ERM disclosure.
Jensen (1993), in his research entitled The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and
the Failure of Internal Control Systems, and Yermack (1996), argue that the smaller size of the board of commissioners is more
effective in monitoring company managers. Boards of commissioners with a large
number tend to be less effective because of the possibility of being involved
in greater conflict in the decision-making process, which will affect the
company's level of disclosure Wang & Hussainey (2013). This can be related to communication and coordination problems, such
as extended decision-making time, increased costs, and poor communication,
which can occur in companies with larger commissioners (Al-Maghzom et al., 2016 ). Therefore, a company with a larger board of commissioners has lower
effectiveness than a company with a smaller board of commissioners.
As for those that
support a negative relationship between board size and voluntary risk
management (Al-Maghzom et al., 2019; Elgammal et al., 2018; Wang
& Hussainey, 2013), at the same
time, the results of previous studies show a positive relationship between
board size and risk management (Manurung & Kusumah, 2016; Sulistyaningsih &
Gunawan, 2016; Wicaksono & Adiwibowo, 2017).
Influence of the Independent
Board of Commissioners on ERM Disclosures
The test results show no significant effect of
the independent board of commissioners on risk management. This is evidenced by a
significance of 0.062 (a significance greater than 0.05). So that the board of
commissioners is independent no significant effect on ERM disclosure. The
coefficient value of the Independent Board of Commissioners (X 3 )
is b 3 = 0.042, so there is a positive influence, meaning that every
increase in the Board of independent commissioners can increase ERM disclosure
in a company.
The insignificant relationship
between independent commissioners on the level of risk management is consistent
with (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Rodrνguez et al., 2014). This
finding suggests that a high proportion of independent commissioners in a
company does not guarantee that disclosure risk will be high. The existence of
an independent commissioner in Indonesia does not play a significant role in
encouraging companies to provide high-risk disclosures. This result was caused
by the appointment of an independent commissioner only for the sake of
complying with regulations, not to implement good corporate governance (Nurul et al., 2021)
Independent
commissioners in a company are only formalities to comply with regulations,
where each company is required to have a minimum of 30% independent
commissioners on the board, so the existence of these independent commissioners
is not to carry out a good oversight function and not to use their independence
to oversee the policies of the directors Pangestuti et al . , (2017). In addition, the insignificant value of the independent commissioners
can also be caused by the quality and educational background of the members of
the board of commissioners. Previous research stated that
independent commissioners had no influence on risk disclosure (Elzahar & Hussainey (2012).
This insignificant result is probably because the company's independent
commissioners need more vital insight into providing independent advice to
members of the board of commissioners in convincing management to act in the
interests of shareholders.
The results of this study are
not in accordance with the results of the research (Jia et al., 2019; Sulistyaningsih & Gunawan,
2016; Wicaksono & Adiwibowo, 2017). However,
research results support these results (Kinasih, 2016; Haryanti & Hardiyanti, 2021;
Pangestuti et al., 2017).
Effect of
Managerial Ownership on ERM Disclosure
The test results show no
significant effect of managerial ownership on risk management. This is
evidenced by a significance of 0.050 (a significance greater than
0.05). So managerial ownership has no significant effect on risk management.
The managerial ownership coefficient (X 4 ) is b 4 = 0.049, so there is a positive influence, meaning
that the greater the managerial ownership, the better the quality of a
company's ERM disclosure.
Managerial ownership has no
effect on ERM disclosure. This is not in line with agency theory which states
that if management also owns company shares, it can minimize
information asymmetry or agency conflicts between agents and owners (Hidayah, 2017). This is because the management, who also acts as the
owner of the company, already knows clearly what risks can worsen the condition
of the company and its investment; they also know the amount of costs that will
be incurred in ERM disclosure so that management assumes that ERM disclosure is
not necessary.
The results of this study are
in accordance with the previous statement, which stated that managerial
ownership has no effect on risk management disclosures by Prayoga & Almilia (2013).
This is because management has a dual role as management as well as a
shareholder so that management has been aware of the risks faced by the company
even though they are not disclosed in the financial statements and has taken
into account the costs for disclosing the company's risk management. Therefore,
management assumes the company's risk management does not need to be disclosed.
The results of
this study need to follow the results of the research (Adam et al., 2016; Leksmono, 2020; Sulistyaningsih
& Gunawan, 2016). However,
these results are relevant to other studies that state
that managerial ownership does not affect risk management (Alkurdi et al., 2019; Khumairoh & Agustina, 2017;
Prayoga & Almilia, 2013; Salem et al., 2019).
Effect of Institutional
Ownership on ERM Disclosure
The test results show a significant
effect of institutional ownership on risk management. This is
evidenced by a significance of 0.000 (significance smaller than
0.05). So that institutional ownership has a significant effect on risk. The
coefficient value of institutional ownership (X 5 ) is b 5 =
0.008, so there is a positive influence, meaning that the greater the
institutional ownership, the better the quality of a company's ERM disclosure.
Agency theory
explains that larger institutional ownership has extra oversight to monitor
disclosure policies. High levels of institutional ownership lead to greater
monitoring efforts by institutional investors to inhibit the behavior of
managers who prioritize their interests, ultimately harming company owners.
Institutional ownership's role will encourage companies to be more transparent
in disclosing information.
Ownership significantly
minimizes agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling (1976). A higher
level of institutional ownership will lead to more extraordinary monitoring
efforts by investors to inhibit the behavior of managers concerned with their
interests, which can ultimately harm the company. The results of this study
support the statement that an increase in the number of institutional
shareholders can determine the level of disclosure of company information and
the requirements for broader access to other company information. More
excellent supervision of management by institutional investors will indirectly
put pressure on the quality of risk management disclosures (Ashfaq et al., 2019)
previous research
found that institutional ownership has an effect on
risk management disclosures (Al-Maghzom et al., 2019; Neifar & Jarboui, 2018;
Pangestuti et al., 2017; Pravadinda & Majidah, 2021; Prayoga & Almilia,
2013).
The Influence
of the Audit Committee on ERM Disclosures
The test
results show a significant influence of the Audit Committee on risk management.
This
is evidenced by a significance of 0.000 (significance smaller than
0.05). So the Audit Committee has a significant effect on Risk Management. The
coefficient value of Institutional Ownership (X 5 ) is b 5 =
0.008, so there is a positive influence, meaning that the larger the audit
committee, the better the quality of ERM disclosures.
Agency theory
aims that each related party can get the best for himself (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory
emphasizes mechanisms that can complement contracts to overcome problems that
can cause information asymmetry between the two parties. Adverse selection is
one of the effects caused by information asymmetry, where
management tends to take a safe position for itself in making investment
decisions. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
Establishing an audit committee is a way to encourage the oversight function
and resolve agency problems; this is because the audit committee has an
important role, one of which is overseeing the financial reporting process in
addition to its primary task of ensuring the integrity and credibility of
financial reports (Gajevszky, 2014 )
According to OJK Regulation
Number 55/POJK.04/2015, the audit committee is responsible for recommending the
appointment of an external auditor, overseeing the audit process, management,
and internal audit, and ensuring the credibility of financial reporting. More
prominent audit committees can provide more robust monitoring, leading to
higher transparency (Abdullah et al., 2015). In
addition, good oversight from the audit committee can support transparency and
encourage management to provide more information than is required. Previous research
proves that the audit committee influences risk management (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Tai et al., 2020;
Thesarani, 2017).
CONCLUSION
Company size, board of commissioners size,
independent board of commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional
ownership, and audit committee influence risk management in manufacturing companies listed on
the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the year of observation 2019-2021. The
implications of this research are as follows: 1) Strategic Decision-Making:
This means that the size of the company and the composition of the board of
commissioners play a crucial role in determining the company's approach to risk
management. 2) Corporate Governance Enhancement: Additionally, companies could
consider strengthening their corporate governance structures by including
independent oversight and diverse expertise in risk assessment and mitigation.
3) Investor Confidence:Moreover, the findings underline the importance of risk
management disclosure as a way to build investor confidence. Manufacturing
companies should ensure transparent and accurate reporting of their risk
management practices to attract and retain investors.
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