



THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT FINDINGS, AUDITOR CHANGE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE, LEVERAGE AND SPA ON AUDIT OPINIONS OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT BPK IN INDONESIA

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
audit opinion, audit findings, auditor change, local government size, leverage, silpa.	This study aims to examine and find empirical evidence of the effect of audit findings, auditor turnover, local government size, leverage and SiLPA (Budget Overtime) on local government BPK audit opinions in Indonesia. This study used a sample of 506 from a total of 514 local governments (districts and cities) throughout Indonesia with the observation year 2017 – 2020, so the total sample used was 1,915. The type of data used in this research is secondary data. The research data source was obtained through the Information Management and Documentation Officer Electronic service (E-PPID) at http://e-ppid.bpk.go.id . The sampling method uses purposive sampling, while the data analysis technique uses multiple linear regression analysis. The study results show that audit findings, local government size and leverage affect local government audit opinions. At the same time, auditor turnover and SiLPA do not affect local government audit opinions in Indonesia. Furthermore, from the results of this study, the variables that can be examined in subsequent studies include performance reports, audit quality, years of service/auditor experience, amount of capital expenditure, Special Allocation Funds received by local governments and qualifications of local government financial report preparers. In addition, the distribution of local governments according to island location will also be an exciting audit opinion study.

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INTRODUCTION

Local government financial reports are a form of regional financial accountability to realize transparency and accountability. Regional government financial reports are prepared to provide relevant information regarding the financial position and all transactions carried out by local governments during a reporting period. Regional government financial reports are mainly used to determine the value of economic resources used to carry out government operational activities, assess financial conditions, evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of a local government, and help determine compliance with laws and regulations (Indonesia, 2010).

As mandated in Government Regulation Number 58 of 2005, which has been refined by Government Regulation Number 12 of 2019 concerning Regional Financial Management, in the context of accountability for the implementation of the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD), regional governments prepare Regional Government Financial Reports (LKPD). The preparation of LKPD is carried out by the Regional Financial Management Officer (PPKD) by combining (consolidating) the financial reports of the Regional Work Units (SKPD) no later than 3 (three) months after the end of the fiscal year following statutory provisions (Indonesia, 2019).

Furthermore, the regional heads submit financial reports to the Financial Audit Board (BPK) no later than 3 (three) months after the end of the fiscal year for an audit which must be completed no later than 2 (two) months after receiving the financial reports from the local government. In the following process, the regional head submits the draft regional regulation on accountability for the implementation of the APBD to the DPRD accompanied by a financial report that has been audited by the BPK no later than 6 (six) months after the end of the fiscal year.

Audits conducted by the BPK are an essential part of the management and accountability of state finances. The BPK and other state institutions must encourage the achievement of state objectives as stated in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. BPK does this through a free and independent examination of the management and responsibility of state finances (BPK, 2017).

BPK is a state institution that has the right to express audit opinions, in this case, it plays an active role as an agency that oversees government-managed finances and synergizes to create government performance outputs that can provide the best service in all sectors for the community, which is the main focus of the performance results carried out. Government. After the reformation took place, changes in structure and everything that happened in the government bureaucracy, but the goal ultimately boils down to performance that can carry out the goals that have been set and planned previously as well as possible. As a manifestation of transparency and accountability for the management of state finances carried out by the Regional Government, the Regional Government is obliged to prepare Regional Government Financial Reports (LKPD), which will then be audited by a free and independent auditing institution in this case (BPK RI). In addition to Financial Reports that describe financial accountability, in the context of realizing good governance in Regional Governments, it is necessary to develop and implement an accountability system that is appropriate, clear, measurable, and legitimate so that governance and development can take place in an efficient, effective, clean and accountable manner. Free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism (performance accountability).

Supervising and examining the management of state finances is the duty of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK). BPK audit results can be in the form of an Audit Report (LHP), which reflects the level of accountability of a Regional Government Financial Report (LKPD). To assess the fairness of LKPD, BPK RI conducts an audit, the results of which are outlined in the LHP. The opinion in the report reveals non-compliance with regulations that have a direct and material effect on the presentation of the financial statements. The success of local governments in obtaining WTP opinions will affect the success of local government financial performance (Suwanda, 2015). The LKPD shows how much APBD funds are used to carry out the performance that the Regional Government wants to achieve (Nurdin et al., 2014).

Therefore, this research was conducted to determine what factors influence BPK's Audit Opinion. The research gap in this study is that there are not many studies that have re-examined the factors influencing local government BPK audit opinions in Indonesia by focusing on the primary research variables, namely BPK audit opinions and independent variables, namely the number of audit findings, auditor turnover, local government size, leverage and SiLPA. The difference between this study and previous studies is that this study focuses on local government audit opinions, which still need to be improved compared to studies on audit opinions in the private sector.

The theory that underlies this research is agency *theory*. According to (Gustavson & Sundström, 2018), supervision in the public sector is described theoretically following the logic of the agency problem (agent-principal) as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in (Vitolla et al., 2020) as the relationship between agent and principal. The people, as the highest principle, give a mandate to political representatives to take care of the public interest. Furthermore, political representatives

delegate the implementation of public affairs to public officials (agents). Therefore, the need for supervision and control over the performance of public officials increases.

Agency theory argues that information asymmetry will occur because the government has more information about its resources in the form of the State/Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget than the public. This asymmetry allows misappropriation or acts of corruption by the government as an agent (Rini et al., 2017).

Because of *agency problems*, the government must be monitored to ensure that regional financial management is fully compliant with various applicable rules and regulations. One form of supervision is conducting financial and government performance audits by the BPK and the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus, which aim to encourage good governance (BPK, 2017).

The audit conducted by the BPK encourages state financial management to achieve state objectives, among others, through increased accountability, transparency, economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the management and accountability of state finances in the form of constructive recommendations and effective follow-up; and increasing public trust in the results of BPK audits and management of state finances (BPK, 2017).

Another theory that underlies this research is institutional. *The institutional* theory argues that organizations are shaped by the institutional environment that surrounds them. Organizations are social systems whose forms are influenced by symbolic systems, culture and the broader social aspects of the organization (Yustina & Gudono, 2017). Organizational structure is not only determined by the task environment but also by society's situation in general. In other words, the form of organization is determined by society's legitimacy, effectiveness, and rationalization.

Regional government as an organization or government institution will always be under the control and supervision of the community. This can be seen from several regulations requiring each regional government to submit accountability reports on the administration of governance promptly. Furthermore, to increase public trust in the accountability report on governance and management of state finances, an audit must be carried out by the BPK.

Some research on the factors that influence audit opinions of local government financial statements in Indonesia, some of which are as follows: (Hamidayanti & Wardani, 2019), (Budiartha & Indarti, 2019), (Andani et al., 2019), (Suryaningsih & Sisdyani, 2016), (Wijayanti & Suryandari, 2020), (Simarmata, 2019), (Dewata et al., 2018), (Sutopo et al., 2017), (Purnama et al., 2018), (Yaya & Pawestri, 2021), (Revelation, 2019).

Based on the discussion of the theory used as the basis of the research, the results of previous studies that are relevant to the topic under study, which is then described in a conceptual framework, the hypothesis developed in this study is as follows.

1. Audit Findings

The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) is tasked with conducting state financial audits consisting of financial audits, performance audits, and audits with specific objectives. The results of the audit conducted by the BPK are in the form of opinions, findings, and conclusions in the form of recommendations. BPK audit findings are cases found on government financial reports for violations committed by a region against internal control provisions and applicable laws and regulations so that they will affect the auditor's opinion after an audit. This is supported by the results of research (Widodo & Sudarno, 2017) which state that findings on SPI and findings on compliance, which are audit findings, affect BPK's audit opinion.

Suppose the local government gets a few audit findings. In that case, the regional government's financial reports have been prepared with good *corporate governance*, an adequate

control system and a high level of compliance with laws and regulations, so it is expected to obtain an audit opinion. From BPK, and vice versa, more audit findings will undoubtedly influence the auditor's opinion. Based on this description, the hypothesis developed is as follows:

H1: Audit Findings affect BPK's Audit Opinion

2. Auditor Change

In the process of auditing local government financial reports, there may be changes between BPK auditors. Some reasons for a rational change of auditors include the fact that the auditor has been auditing a local government for a long time, so it requires a refresher on the audit assignment, or it is purely mandatory from the BPK leadership.

Auditing the financial statements of local governments that have changed BPK auditors requires a relatively long time to understand the characteristics of local governments as auditees. Hence, the auditors require a relatively long time to complete the audit process.

Meanwhile, the process of auditing local government financial reports that have not experienced a change in BPK auditors requires a relatively shorter time because the auditor already understands the characteristics of the local government enough from the audits that have been carried out in the past period or year so that this auditor change may affect the BPK audit opinion.

H2: Auditor Change affects BPK's Audit Opinion

3. Local Government Size

Based on the findings (Cohen & Kaimenaki, 2011) states that the greater the number of assets, the more problems will be faced by local governments, especially in the management of resources, so a large number of asset values will have great demands in reporting mandatory disclosures to the public. This finding is in line with findings (Wicaksono, 2013), namely, the larger the size of a local government, the greater the assets it has; of course, this will cause difficulties in governance and accountability. Based on this description, a hypothesis can be developed.

H3: The size of the Regional Government affects the BPK Audit Opinion

4. leverage

Research (Sumarjo, 2010) states that "The greater the leverage ratio, the more it shows an entity is unable to finance its operations because it requires funds from external parties, whereas the smaller the leverage ratio, the greater the ability of an entity to finance operational costs through its internal funds." This opinion implies that the greater the leverage owned by an entity, the worse the entity's financial independence level, and the smaller the leverage owned by an entity, the better the entity's independence or financial independence.

The leverage ratio shows the financial risk of the local government due to the risk of default or failure to fulfil its debts or obligations. This is what the BPK auditors then pay attention to in considering the adequacy and accuracy of the evidence obtained and conducting tests to assess that regional financial management has been carried out following the principles of good governance. This condition may affect the BPK audit opinion.

H4: Leverage affects BPK's Audit Opinion

5. SiLPA (Budget Calculation Excess Time)

This SiLPA, according to Government Regulation 58 of 2005, is the excess difference between the realization of budget revenues and expenditures during one budget period. Permendagri 13 of 2006 article 137 states that the excess budget calculation (SiLPA) for the previous year is the financing used for: a. Covering the budget deficit if actual revenue is less than actual spending, b. They are funding the implementation of follow-up activities at the expense of direct spending, c. Funding other obligations until the end of the fiscal year have yet to be completed.

The occurrence of SiLPA only sometimes indicates that the regional government's performance is good in terms of efficiency in managing regional expenditures. However, it could be due to the realization of spending or spending that is lower than the stipulated budget, which occurs due to programs/activities that were not implemented in the relevant fiscal year so that the budget was not absorbed. Optimally, therefore SiLPA can be considered by BPK auditors in determining their audit opinion on local governments.

H5: SiLPA influences BPK's Audit Opinion

METHODS

This study uses secondary data from the 2017-2020 BPK Audit Results Report (LHP). The research data source was obtained from BPK's LHP, published through the Information Management Officer and Documentation Electronic service (E-PPID) via <https://e-ppid.bpk.go.id/>. The object of this research is the local government BPK audit opinion, while the research subjects in this study are local governments (districts/cities) throughout Indonesia, excluding provincial governments. The thing to consider is that the characteristics of the provincial government are different from the district/city governments in terms of government affairs, area coverage, governance, financial resources, information technology used and so on. Based on data from the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2017-2020 there were 416 districts and 98 cities spread across 34 provinces in Indonesia on 7 islands/archipelago, bringing a total of 514 districts/cities. Based on predetermined sampling criteria, a sample of 480 districts/cities met the criteria as a research sample.

Table 1. Results of Research Data Collection

Sample Selection Criteria	Regency	City	Amount
Number of Regencies/Cities throughout Indonesia	416	98	514
Districts/Cities that meet the sampling criteria	398	82	480
Data that meets the sampling criteria during the study period (2017-2020)			1915

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistical testing is intended to provide an overview of the distribution and behaviour of sample data. The descriptive statistical test calculates each sample data's mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. Descriptive statistical test results can be seen in the following table.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistical Test Results

	OA	TA	PA	SZ	LV	SP
Means	0.808877	12.51697	0.588512	28.52553	0.018731	24.88885
Median	1.000000	1200000	1.000000	28.45584	0.008990	24.99786
Maximum	1.000000	29.00000	1.000000	31.12454	0.999345	28.33283
Minimum	0.000000	2,000000	0.000000	27.09582	3.06E-08	20.85115
std. Dev.	0.393288	4.422336	0.492232	0.514672	0.050342	1.158366
Observations	1915	1915	1915	1915	1915	1915

Source: processed data (2022)

Based on the results of the descriptive statistical test on the 1,915 research samples in table 2 above, it can be explained the minimum (minimum), maximum (maximum), median (median), average (mean), and standard deviation (std. dev) values of each research variable as follows:

- 1) The Audit Opinion variable (OA) has the lowest value (minimum) of 0, the highest value (maximum) of 1, the median value (median) of 1, the average value (mean) of 0.808877, meaning that the data from the Audit Opinion variable (OA) focus or generally located at 0.808877. The standard deviation (std. dev) is 0.393288, meaning that if there is an average deviation, the deviation is not more than 0.393288. The standard deviation value of the Audit Opinion (OA) Variable is smaller when compared to the average value of Audit Opinion (OA), indicating that this Variable does not have data that differs from one data to another.
- 2) The Audit Findings Variable (TA) has the lowest value (minimum) of 2 findings, the highest value (maximum) of 29 findings, the median value (median) of 12 findings, the average value (mean) of 12.51697 findings means, data from the Audit Findings variable (TA) centred or generally located on 12.51697 findings. The standard deviation (std. dev) is 4.422336 findings, meaning that if there is an average deviation, the deviation is no more than 4.422336. The standard deviation value of the Audit Findings (TA) variable is smaller when compared to the average Audit Findings (TA) value indicating that this Variable does not have data that differs from one data to another.
- 3) The auditor Turnover variable (PA) has the lowest value (minimum) of 0, the highest value (maximum) of 1, the median value (median) of 1, the average value (mean) of 0.588512, meaning that the data from the Auditor Turnover variable (PA) is centred or at generally located at 0.588512. The standard deviation (std. dev) is 0.492232, meaning that if there is an average deviation, the deviation is not more than 0.488. The standard deviation value of the Auditor Turnover (PA) Variable is smaller when compared to the average Auditor Turnover (PA) value indicating that this Variable does not have data that differs from one data to another.
- 4) The Variable Size of Local Government (SZ) has the lowest (minimum) value of 27.09582 trillion, the highest (maximum) value of 31.12454 trillion; the median (median) value is 28.45584 trillion, the average value (mean) is 28.52553 trillion meaning, data from the variable Regional Government Size (SZ) concentrated or generally located at 28.52553 trillion. The standard deviation (std. dev) is 0.514672 trillion, meaning that if there is an average deviation, the deviation is no more than 0.514672 trillion. The standard deviation value of the Local Government Size (SZ) variable is smaller when compared to the average Regional Government Size (SZ) value indicating that this Variable does not have data that differs from one data to another.
- 5) The leverage variable (LV) has a minimum (minimum) value of 0, maximum (maximum) value of 0.999345, median value (median) of 0.008990, and average (mean) value of 0.018731, that is, data from the Leverage variable (LV) is centred or generally located at 0.018731. The standard deviation (std. dev) is 0.050342, meaning that if there is an average deviation, the deviation is no more than 0.050342. The standard deviation value of the Leverage (LV) variable is more significant when compared to the average Leverage (LV) value indicating that this Variable has data that differs from one data to another.
- 6) The SiLPA variable (SP) has a minimum (minimum) value of 20.85115 trillion, a maximum (maximum) value of 28.33283 trillion, a median value of 24.99786 trillion, an average value (mean) of 24.88885 trillion, meaning that data from the variable Profitability (PF) centred or generally located at 24.8888 billion. The standard deviation (std. dev) is 1.158366 trillion, meaning that if there is an average deviation, the deviation is no more than 1.158366 trillion. The standard deviation value of the Profitability (PF) variable is smaller when compared to the

average Profitability (PF) value indicating that this Variable does not have data that differs from one data to another.

B. Classical Assumption Testing

This research has gone through the testing stages. It is free from classical assumption problems for multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and normality problems. However, for the heteroscedasticity test, the data used in this study did not pass because the data is not random, which is one of the limitations of this study.

C. Hypothesis test

After passing the classic assumption test, hypothesis testing can be carried out. Test the hypothesis in this study using multiple linear regression analysis. To find out the relationship between the independent (free) variables that affect the dependent (dependent) Variable is carried out through the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) approach, which is shown in the following table.

Table 3. Hypothesis Test Results

Variables	coefficient	std. Error	t-Statistics	Prob.
C	-1.624916	0.486877	-3.337424	0.0009
TA	-0.016545	0.001984	-8.337041	0.0000
PA	-0.028438	0.017694	-1.607203	0.1082
SZ	0.087137	0.019275	4.520626	0.0000
LV	-0.729721	0.174041	-4.192806	0.0000
SP	0.007460	0.008661	0.861370	0.3891

Source: Processed data (2022)

Based on table 3 above, the regression equation is:

$$OA = \alpha + \beta_1(TA) + \beta_2(PA) + \beta_3(SZ) + \beta_4(LV) + \beta_5(SP) + e$$

$$OA = -1.624916 - 0.016545TA - 0.028438PA + 0.087137SZ - 0.729721LV + 0.007460SP + e$$

Information:

- ca = Constant = -1.624916
- TA = Audit Findings β_1 = -0.016545
- PA = Change of Auditor β_2 = -0.028438
- SZ = Size β_3 = 0.087137
- LV = leverage β_4 = -0.729721
- SP = SiLPA β_5 = 0.007460

The test results for the coefficient of determination (R^2) are presented in the following table.

Table 4. Test Results for the Coefficient of Determination (R^2)

Model	R-squared	Adjusted R-squared	SE of regression
1	0, 066190	0, 063744	0.380547

Source: Processed data (2022)

Based on the test results obtained an R-Squared value of 0.066190 with an Adjusted R-Square of 0.063744; this indicates that the variation of the dependent variable Audit Opinion (OA), can be explained by the independent variables, namely Audit Findings (TA), Auditor Turnover (PA), Size of Local Government (SZ), Leverage (LV), SiLPA of 6.3744%. Meanwhile, other variables outside the study explain the rest (100% - 6.3744% = 93.6256%).

The results of the simultaneous significance test (F test) are presented in the following table

Table 5. Simultaneous Significance Test Results (F Test)

F-statistics	Prob(F-statistic)
27.06243	0.000000

Source: *Processed data (2022)*

From the test results, the calculated F value or F-statistic is 27.06243 with a p-value or Prob (F-statistic) of 0.000000, which is less than 0.05. This means that together all the independent variables affect the dependent Variable. This also means that the research model follows the hypothesis.

The results of the partial significance test (t-test) or t-test are presented in the following table.

Table 6. Partial Significance Test Results (t-test)

Variables	coefficient	t-Statistics	Prob.	Hypothesis Answer
C	-1.624916	-3.337424	0.0009	
TA	-0.016545	-8.337041	0.0000	Accept H ₀
PA	-0.028438	-1.607203	0.1082	Reject H ₀
SZ	0.087137	4.520626	0.0000	Accept H ₀
LV	-0.729721	-4.192806	0.0000	Accept H ₀
SP	0.007460	0.861370	0.3891	Reject H ₀

Source: *Processed data (2022)*

The Partial Significance test (t-test) results show that audit findings, local government size and leverage affect BPK's audit opinion. At the same time, auditor turnover and SiLPA do not affect BPK's audit opinion.

1) Audit Findings and Audit Opinion

Based on Table 6, Hypothesis 1 (H₁) is accepted, so it can be concluded that audit findings influence the Audit Opinion of local government. For local governments that get few audit findings, it can be assumed that the local government finances have been prepared with good corporate governance so that the auditor obtains adequate confidence with the tests carried out by providing a good Audit Opinion. On the other hand, if a local government gets many audit findings, it can be assumed that the local government's financial statements are prepared with poor corporate governance, so the auditor will need further testing of the evidence, including testing the possibility of repeated findings. This condition, of course, can affect the Audit Opinion. In addition, the Supreme Audit Agency must be careful in determining and considering findings. Especially findings indicate criminal acts and losses in managing state finances. The Auditor for the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia must prepare audit documentation to provide clear and adequate information to support audit findings, conclusions, and audit recommendations, as well as the reasons behind all the convincing things needed in disclosing these findings. These conditions may also affect the Audit Opinion. This study's results align with research (Widodo & Sudarno, 2017), which found empirical evidence that audit findings affect audit opinion.

2) Change of Auditor and Audit Opinion

Based on Table 6, hypothesis 2 (H₂) is rejected so that it can be concluded that the change of auditors does not affect the audit opinion of the local government. The audit team of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia, who audited the financial reports of local governments, has the experience and professional audit skills that are relatively the same between one auditor team and another. Even though there is a change in audit assignment from one auditor team to another auditor team, it will not affect the process and time of the audit, so the change of auditors does

not affect the audit opinion of the local government. In addition, the Supreme Audit Agency has State Financial Audit Standards, which must be guided in conducting audits of state financial management. The BPK also tries to comply with the audit deadline stipulated in Government Regulation 12 of 2019 concerning Regional Financial Management by 2 (two) months after receiving financial reports from the regional government. The auditor team's adherence to audit standards and deadlines is why auditor changes have no effect on the audit opinion of the local government. The results of this study are in line with the results of research (Djunaidi & Soepriyanto, 2013), which found empirical evidence that auditor change does not affect audit opinion.

3) Local Government Size and Audit Opinion

Based on Table 6, hypothesis 3 (H3) is accepted, so it can be concluded that local government size influences audit opinion. Large local governments tend to have good resources, including sound information technology systems, reasonable and adequate numbers of financial and accounting human resources, adequate internal control systems and strong oversight (Tullah et al., 2019). These good resources are the essential capital for regional governments in managing sound regional finances, which are reflected in accountable local government financial reports to facilitate audit work. Meanwhile, small local governments tend to have inadequate resources, including sober information technology systems, financial and accounting human resources that need to be improved in quality and quantity, inadequate/inadequate internal control systems and weak oversight. The results of this study are in line with the results of the research (Wicaksono, 2013).

4) Leverage and Audit Opinion

Based on Table 6, hypothesis 4 (H4) is accepted, so it can be concluded that the leverage owned by the local government influences audit opinion. The leverage ratio shows the financial risk of the local government due to the risk of default or failure to fulfil its debts or obligations. This is what the BPK auditors then pay attention to in considering the adequacy and accuracy of the evidence obtained and conducting tests to assess that the principles of good governance have carried out regional financial management. A high leverage ratio indicates increased local government financial risk due to the high risk of default or failure to fulfil obligations. High liabilities (debt) will impact local government budgeting in the following fiscal year, where expenditure must be allocated to pay obligations (debt) in the previous fiscal year. This causes the auditor to increase the adequacy and accuracy of the evidence obtained and to carry out tests to reduce audit risk that can affect audit opinion.

Meanwhile, a low leverage ratio indicates a low local government financial risk from the low risk of default or failure to fulfil obligations. This causes the auditor to reduce the adequacy and accuracy of the evidence obtained and perform testing so that it can affect the audit opinion. This study's results align with the research (Sumarjo, 2010).

5) SiLPA and Audit Opinion

Based on Table 6, hypothesis 5 (H5) is rejected, so it can be concluded that SiLPA does not influence audit opinion. The sum of the difference between regional government budget revenue and expenditure measures the SiLPA of regional government. The size of the SiLPA does not affect the audit opinion because a large SiLPA is not necessarily the success of the regional government in providing significant funds but rather the efficiency of budget execution or the regional government's failure in implementing its programs and activities.

CONCLUSION

This study aims to examine and find empirical evidence of the influence of audit findings, auditor turnover, local government size, leverage and SiLPA on local government audit opinions in Indonesia. Based on the results of the research, the results of data analysis and the discussion, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1) Audit findings have an effect on local government audit opinions, 2) Auditor turnover has no effect on local government audit opinions, 3) Local government size has an effect on local government audit opinions, 4) Leverage owned by the local government affects the audit opinion of the local government, 5) SiLPA (Budget Calculation Overtime) has no effect on the local government audit opinion.

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